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COST EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGAL
COMPLIANCE: AN ANALYSIS OF
SECURITIES LAW COMPLIANCE FOR
THE START-UP COMPANY
Douglas A. Tanner*
Securities law, especially to the nonpractitioner, is a complex
array of technical regulations. Companies attempting to comply
with these regulations often face burdensome costs in relation to
existing resources. This can be especially true for start-up compa-
nies which must apply their limited resources to building their busi-
ness. For this reason, such companies may take short-cuts in
securities law compliance. Such decisions made with good reason
at the early stages of the company's growth can hinder, or even
prevent, realization of long-term company goals.
This article first explores cost-effectiveness as applied to securi-
ties law compliance, exploring why the approach is valid in this
context. Then, by analyzing the uncertainties and choices available
in the application of exemptions from registration and qualification
in small business offerings, the article shows that in many areas
there are broad degrees of compliance. Subjective decisions in-
volved in choosing a conservative or liberal approach to compliance
encourage clients to consider the resources required to be expended
to reach a given degree of compliance. The article focuses on the
costs of an aggressive compliance approach (which may risk non-
compliance),' highlighting particular areas in which cutting corners
on compliance may disproportionately increase future costs. Such
an evaluation may allow an intelligent cost/benefit approach to be
taken. Although the article touches on some aspects of state securi-
Copyright © 1986 Douglas A. Tanner. All Rights Reserved.
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1. For the purposes of this article, "non-compliance" is used broadly to mean a deci-
sion not to take the most conservative and clearly correct legal course. It is not intended to
imply that the chosen course is clearly violative of the securities laws. Non-compliance must
be read in relation to the range of possible compliance outlined in this article.
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ties compliance, only the specific provisions of federal law are em-
ployed in the analysis of these issues.
I. THE COST-EFFECTIVE CLIENT AND THE RISKS OF
INCOMPLETE COMPLIANCE
Most practicing attorneys are familiar with the horrified look
of disbelief that arises as the attorney summarizes to the client the
burdens of securities law compliance for a proposed client transac-
tion. Counsel who suggest a narrow, conservative approach to legal
matters often encounter the surprising disrespect many entrepre-
neurs exhibit for a system so complex. Such insistence on technical
and absolute compliance may not recognize the business context.
In doing so, the attorney may lose sight of the role of legal counsel
which is to provide sufficient legal information to the client so that
the client can make an appropriate business decision. This role can
be especially difficult for the attorney when compliance may be ar-
guable in many instances.
Federal and state securities law issues arise in the formation
and growth of every business. For a large number of securities
transactions, federal law is ignored because of unfamiliarity or lack
of information. A significant business financing, however, with in-
vestors other than relatives or sophisticated financial institutions,
requires attention to compliance with applicable law. Compliance
can be viewed as an absolute-a matter of black and white. In
many areas, however, compliance more realistically depends upon a
series of judgmental calls. The attorney who insists upon very con-
servative calls in all cases often mixes legal and business decisions.
The entrepreneur usually weighs whether to comply meticulously,
achieving a certainty of compliance, or to take a leaner approach
that presents greater risk, but also a higher probability of achieving
business goals. This approach clearly implies cost/benefit analysis:
the decision to incur reasonable risk in order to achieve a desired
goal. If a cost/benefit approach is legitimate in connection with se-
curities compliance decisions, attorneys should direct legal advice
to facilitating these decisions.
Can a cost/benefit approach be justified in the face of the direct
statutory and regulatory requirements applicable to sales of securi-
ties? If a pure economic decision is appropriate, the client would
evaluate the cost of a particular course of action in comparison with
the individual benefit to be gained by such action. As an extreme,
the free enterprise system operates on this principle, with the justice
system internalizing social costs so that they are borne by the bene-
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fiting individual. In the context of a securities transaction, the cost
to a client consists of more than the mere monetary cost for profes-
sional and other assistance necessary to comply with the law. The
client also faces an indirect cost--compliance may place restrictions
on the client's actions which may cause the offering to fail. Legal
compliance may delay the start of the sale of securities or require
that an offering be restricted in a manner that assures failure.
Compliance also benefits the client by cost-avoidance which al-
lows the client to avoid costs associated with failure to comply with
securities laws. In addition, compliance may protect social standing
and recognition that might be lost through non-compliance. In bal-
ancing these factors, a client should discount the cost of the non-
compliance by the probability of non-compliance being discovered
and established. From the perspective of the entrepreneur, this
evaluation of costs and benefits is similar to that in any other busi-
ness decision.
Of course, an attorney should not make a cost/benefit decision
and ethically advise a client to violate the law.2 If the client ex-
presses an intent to violate express statutory requirements in an of-
fering of securities, the attorney may wish to disassociate himself or
herself from the transaction.3 However, in the securities area, the
client may choose among a range of actions, none of which are ille-
gal, but some of which may be on the borderline of compliance.
The attorney therefore is often faced with difficult decisions. The
more the attorney understands the issues and can advise the client
of the true costs and risks, the better that attorney can serve his or
her client. There may be a broad area in which an attorney would
not be willing to opine that the law has been complied with, but
where a colorable claim of compliance exists. In these areas, the
client, properly advised, should be the person choosing the course of
action.
Obviously, taking a cost/benefit approach to compliance raises
2. For example, pursuant to Rule 7-101 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the
State Bar of California, a member of the state bar cannot advise the violation of any law, rule
or ruling of a tribunal unless he believes in good faith that such law, rule or ruling is invalid.
CAL. RULES PROF. CONDUCT Rule 7-101 (West 1984).
3. Rule 1.16(b)(1) of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct allows a lawyer to withdraw from representation of a client if the client persists in a
course of conduct the lawyer reasonably believes to be criminal or fraudulent. A lawyer is
not required by Rule 1.16 to withdraw unless the lawyer's actions are furthering a violation of
law or violate the rules of professional conduct. In addition, it is possible that continued
involvement by the attorney in an offering which is found to be fraudulent may result in
personal liability on the part of counsel. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.16 (1983).
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risks not present in most business decisions. The securities laws in-
clude both civil and criminal provisions. Non-compliance may
have much higher costs than in other business decisions. Business-
men are not in business to violate established rules. But as the se-
curities laws have no absolute standards in many instances, costs
can be evaluated in terms of a risk of non-compliance. These risks
can be divided into three general areas: (1) criminal liability; (2)
liability for fraudulent acts; and (3) civil liability for failure to regis-
ter an offering required to be registered. For the reasons to be dis-
cussed below, the third area has the most significant practical effect
on the cost/benefit approach of most clients.
Both federal and state securities statutes provide criminal sanc-
tions for knowing violators.4 The application of criminal sanctions
would normally decide on its face the outcome of any cost/benefit
trade-off. However, the rarity of prosecutions under these provi-
sions and the egregious facts under which such prosecutions ordina-
rily occur significantly lessens the perceived cost of these sanctions.
Given colorable compliance, criminal provisions would not nor-
mally weigh heavily as a cost to a person not contemplating fraud.'
Both federal and state laws also contain antifraud provisions
which provide for civil damages to a purchaser for losses caused by
material misstatements or omissions.6 These provisions have been
held generally to require scienter, or some knowing or reckless ele-
ment associated with the disclosures.7 Although these provisions
4. Under section 24 of the 1933 Act, any person who willfully offers or sells unregis-
tered securities for which no exemption is available is subject to both a fine and imprison-
ment. 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1983). Similarly, sections 25540 and 25541 of the California
Corporate Securities Law of 1968 [hereinafter cited as the California Law] provides up to one
year imprisonment and up to $10,000 in fines for one who willfully violates any provision of
the California Law or who willfully employs or defrauds someone in connection with the
offer, purchase or sale of a security. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25540, 25541 (West 1985).
5. Criminal sanctions establish the floor of compliance. Criminal provisions will pre-
vent a person from absolutely ignoring the securities laws. However, given the uncertainties
of application discussed infra, criminal sanctions do not weigh heavily in determining the
extent of compliance.
6. Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781(2) ("the
1933 Act"), provides that a person who offers or sells a security in writing or orally, and
includes an untrue statement of material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary to
make the statements, in light of the circumstances in which they were made, not misleading
without demonstrating that he did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not
have known of the untruth or omission, is liable to the purchaser at law or equity for the
consideration paid plus interest upon return of the security or for damages. See also section
17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1983), § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1983) ("the 1934 Act"); and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange
Act 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985).
7. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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deter outright fraud, clients normally are not seeking to misstate
facts. Disclosure provisions based upon misstatements or omissions
normally do not necessitate large expenditures, and the costs are
therefore not factored into a decision. Clients may not realistically
assess these provisions as potential costs for two reasons: (1) with
rare exceptions, clients do not intend to commit wrongs and believe
strongly in their company's prospects, and (2) clients undoubtedly
underestimate the creative hindsight of the securities litigation bar
in discovering misstatements and omissions. Antifraud provisions
are therefore sufficient to cause most clients to moderate written
disclosures, but are not major cost concerns in most instances.
A more realistic and easily perceived cost to the client arises
through the registration and qualification requirements. Under fed-
eral law, it is unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to use
interstate commerce or the mails to offer to sell a security without
an applicable exemption unless a registration statement has been
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") under
the Securities Act of 1933 ("the 1933 Act").8 Similarly, under most
state laws, an offer or sale must be qualified unless an exemption is
available.' A person purchasing in an offering in violation of these
provisions has the option of suing the issuer or any person involved
in the offer or sale for rescission or for damages. Thus, sales in
violation are merely sales of "puts," and, independently of intent or
the quality of disclosure, the issuer and its principals become guar-
antors of the venture's success. This prospective invasion of the
founder's personal net worth, independent of the quality of disclo-
sure or knowledge of risk of the buyer, is usually sufficient incentive
to assure cooperation with counsel. If a rescission right were a cer-
tainty in a given course of action, few issuers would choose to
proceed.
But the existence or not of an exemption is not usually clear
cut. Often the course of action that will assure the availability of an
exemption will decrease the probability of successfully raising the
desired funds. Unless a different course can be suggested that both
provides a reasonable possibility of success and clearly removes the
possibility of loss of an exemption, the client may wish to proceed
with the initial course and assume a level of risk that an exemption
would be lost and that compliance may not be adequate. This third
"cost" has the client's attention, but the ultimate question of
8. 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1983).
9. See, e.g., UNIF. STATE SEcuRrrmEs AcT § 301, 7b U.L.A. 550 (1985); CAL. CORP.
CODE § 25110 (West Supp. 1985).
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whether a cost/benefit approach is appropriate rests on whether a
range of compliance in securities offerings of start-up companies is
possible. The next section of this article explores this issue and de-
scribes the uncertainties in application of exemptions from federal
registration in start-up financings.
II. CERTAINTY AND THE PRIVATE OFFERING EXEMPTION-
THE ELUSIVE CONCEPT.
This article has proposed that the costs and benefits of compli-
ance can be evaluated by persons involved in the offer and sale of
securities. However, the approach would have little application in a
world of certainty. For example, one could assume a world in
which federal qualification was required for each sale of securities.
Absent criminal sanctions, failure to qualify a known security
would be a decision to become a guarantor of the investment. With
criminal sanctions, failure to qualify would evidence a perhaps fool-
hardy belief that the seller would not be caught. In both cases,
there remain cost/benefit decisions, but of much more limited ra-
tionality and scope.
As a practical matter, the world of securities law is not one of
absolutes. The creation of exemptions from an absolute qualifica-
tion requirement reflects the admission by legislators and adminis-
trators that the benefit of compliance can appropriately be weighed
against the cost to society of non-compliance." ° If uncertainties are
present in the exemptions themselves, free choice of a range of cost-
effective steps increasing or decreasing the risk of being in non-com-
pliance becomes available. Risk is no longer "on" or "oft", but a
matter of degree corresponding to a range of compliance costs.
This section outlines the reasons that uncertainties in the applica-
tion of exemptions to securities qualification and registration avail-
able to start-up businesses encourage a cost/benefit approach to
compliance. To understand the reasons which often make compli-
ance a matter of judgment, this article first outlines the application
of federal registration exemptions, focusing on those areas in which
counsel can at best provide guidelines for compliance.
For a start-up or early-stage business, federal registration is
prohibitively expensive. Over the past 15 years, the exemptions
10. It should be noted that this societal cost/benefit balance is a different one than that
which the individual contemplating a compliance decision faces. The costs to society are
broader than the individual costs and the benefits are both economic and social. The sanc-
tions inherent in a regulatory pattern help internalize these social costs and benefits of the
individual decision.
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from federal registration available to small business in the sale of
securities have been clarified. Prior to 1974, persons interested in
raising capital for a new or young business had two primary sources
of exemption. The first was section 3(a)(11) of the 1933 Act,"
which exempts from registration any security which is part of an
issue offered and sold only to persons residing within a single state
or territory, where the issuer of such security is a person resident
and doing business within, or if a corporation, incorporated and do-
ing business within such state or territory. The second was the so-
called private offering exemption provided by section 4(2) of the
1933 Act,12 which exempts transactions not involving a public offer-
ing. Although substantial judicial gloss has been added between
1933 and the present, as will be discussed below, the application of
these statutory provisions has not led to certainty in application.
Section 3(a)(11). Section 3(a)(11) provides a transactional ex-
emption which permits intrastate, local financing of businesses both
organized and operating in a single state. For such transactions,
Congress was of the view that state law was adequate to protect
investors. As with section 4(2) of the 1933 Act, the exemption does
not relieve an issuer from civil and criminal sanctions for false, mis-
leading, or fraudulent statements and practices. Many commenta-
tors have pointed out the difficult questions created by the language
of section 3(a)(1 1).13
If a start-up company can take advantage of section 3(a)(l 1), it
reaps the advantages not available to private offerings of being al-
lowed general advertising, no limitations on the number of purchas-
ers and no investor sophistication requirements. Reliance on
section 3(a)(1 1) is recognized by most counsel as being risky, how-
ever, because the exemption can be easily lost for the entire offering
through inadvertence. For example, no definite standards exist
under section 3(a)(l1) for determining an investor's place of resi-
dence, whether the issuer is doing business within the state, or
whether and for how long the securities must remain in the state.
The SEC has long taken the position that a single offer outside the
state, without any such sales, will cause the exemption to be lost for
the balance of an issue sold entirely within the state. 14 An uninten-
11. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (1983).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1983).
13. See, ag., Hicks, Interstate Offerings Under Rule 147, 72 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1974);
Long, A Lawyer's Guide to the Intrastate Exception and Rule 147, 24 DRAKE L. REV. 471
(1975).
14. See Ned J. Bowman Co., 39 S.E.C. 879 (1960); Hillsborough Inv. Co. v. SEC, 276
F.2d 665 (Ist Cir. 1960).
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tional offer to a person who turns out to be a resident of another
state may, therefore, remove the availability of the exemption. For
these reasons, the intrastate offering exemption is not an exemption
of first choice. However, the flexibility provided by such offerings
may allow certain businesses which rely on the intrastate exemption
to be funded that could not otherwise be funded through depen-
dence on other exemptions or safe harbors. An understanding of
the value of this exemption will assist the client in determining if the
risk of non-compliance is justified.
Section 4(2). Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act provides the federal
exemption most often relied upon by start-up issuers. The exemp-
tion has been interpreted as being available for securities offerings to
sophisticated offerees and purchasers who have access to the same
kinds of information that a registration under the 1933 Act would
provide and are able to fend for themselves as knowledgeable inves-
tors, and where the offering is not conducted in a public manner."5
Case law over the last 50 years is full of very strong language re-
stricting availability of the section 4(2) exemption.16 As a result,
the exemption ordinarily is viewed in a restrictive light with sub-
stantial uncertainty of application.
Unfortunately, a great deal of the strong language in these
cases is dicta. Often the facts presented in a given case assure a
finding of liability without reference to one or more of the tests
enunciated. However, at least one commentator has distilled the
statutory law of private placements under section 4(2) to five gen-
eral requirements:
(1) that the offerees met qualification standards;
(2) that the manner of offering was appropriate;
(3) that appropriate information was made available to offerees;
(4) some limitation on the number of offerees and purchasers;
and
(5) the absence of redistribution. 17
A range of factual considerations and experience is involved in eval-
15. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953); SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co.,
463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
16. See, eg., SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co., 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Hill York
Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1971); Lively v.
Hirschfeld, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Custer Channel Wing Corp., 376
F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967). Despite the strong language in
such cases, often the holdings turn in fact on procedural issues such as the failure of defend-
ants to introduce sufficient evidence to carry the burden of proof that an exemption was
available. Id.
17. Schneider, The Statutory Law of Private Placements, 14 REV. OF SECURITIES REG-
ULATIONS 869 (1981).
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uatiig the application of these factors to a particular offering of
securities.
Absent a definitive court decision on the particular facts, how-
ever, there is no absolutely correct answer to whether the exemption
is available in a particular case. It is clear that the larger the group
of offerees and purchasers, the less sophisticated such persons are,
the less control the issuer exerts in monitoring their qualifications,
the fewer pre-existing contacts to the founders and the issuer and
the less information disclosed or to which investors have access, the
greater the risk that the issuer will not be able to sustain the burden
of proof that the section 4(2) exemption is available. The "feel" to a
non-public offering may be lost by the start-up company by inatten-
tion to any one of the above factors. If compliance is strict in all but
one area, an issuer may have more flexibility in the degree of com-
pliance in the last area.
Offeree qualification does not appear to be a strict requirement.
The SEC has itself recognized:
Clearly, in an offering relying exclusively on section 4(2) for an
exemption from registration, all offerees who purchase must pos-
sess the requisite level of sophistication. The sophistication of
each of those to whom the securities are offered who do not
purchase is not a fact that in and of itself should determine
mechanically the availability of the exemption; the number and
the nature of the offerees, however, are relevant in determining
whether an issuer has engaged in a general solicitation or general
advertising that would preclude reliance on the exemption of sec-
tion 4(2).18
If an issuer uses common sense in identifying offerees, provides in-
formation or access to information to all purchasers, and restricts
purchasers to a number that is small if dealing with less sophisti-
cated investors and somewhat larger if dealing only with sophisti-
cated investors, this author believes section 4(2) will generally be
available.
Even if this conclusion is accepted, the ultimate decision as to
whether "generally will be available" is sufficient protection to the
client depends upon the risk aversity and ultimate goals of the cli-
ent. This may place the attorney in an awkward position if the at-
torney believes that the client is making a decision against the
client's best interests. However, the attorney best serves the client
by clearly outlining all the pros and cons of a given course of action.
18. SEC Release No. 33-6455 (Mar. 3, 1983), 27 SEC DOCKET 347, 362, Question and
Answer No. 73.
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If the client never intends to raise additional funds and intends al-
ways to be very closely held, even an extreme degree of risk may be
acceptable. On the other hand, if a future public offering is a cer-
tainty, good business judgment would dictate that additional com-
pliance cost, providing the funds are available, would be well-placed
both to reduce any issues in the registration and to present the best
"face" to the investing public down the line.
As has been discussed, both sections 3(a)(11) and 4(2) of the
1933 Act are full of uncertainties that create risk of liability because
appropriate compliance is not always clear-cut. At the same time,
these uncertainties provide a broad range of chosen compliance that
will reduce or increase the uncertainties involved. It is these uncer-
tainties which encourage start-up companies with few resources or
alternatives to choose a level of compliance expenditures that ac-
cords with their risk profile.
To reduce the uncertainties of the statutory exemptions the
SEC has adopted rules providing safe harbors. These safe harbors
have their own sometimes burdensome requirements and may not
be helpful to all start-up businesses. As will be discussed below,
uncertainties in application of the safe harbors themselves often en-
courage a cost/benefit trade-off. So long as this cost/benefit allows
a supportable argument for compliance with the law, the attorney
should be allowed to continue to represent and assist the client in
choosing the manner to comply with the safe harbors. This would
be true even if the attorney could suggest a more comprehensive
approach.
The SEC adopted Rules 146 and 14719 in 1974 to provide
greater objectivity and certainty in determining whether sections
4(2) and 3(a)(11) exemptions, respectively, were available. On
April 15, 1982, Rule 146 was superseded by Rule 50620 of the Regu-
lation D exemptions. Rules 147 and 506 provide non-exclusive safe
harbors, compliance with which will result in sections 3(a)(1 1) and
4(2), respectively, being deemed available. Because these rules are
non-exclusive, an issuer need not choose between compliance with
either rule and its statutory counterpart.21 The broader statutory
exemption may be a fall back for attempted compliance with the
safe harbor. In addition to Rule 506, Regulation D includes two
additional safe harbors for certain other small offerings.22 Each of
19. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (1985).
20. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (1985), 47 Fed. Reg. 11251 (Mar. 16, 1982).
21. See introductions to 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.147, 230.501 (1985).
22. SEC Rules 504 and 505, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-505 (1985).
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the Regulation D safe harbors has a common definitional section
with additional general provisions.
Rule 147. Rule 147 attempts to narrow uncertainties under
Section 3(a)(11) by defining elements such as "person resident,"
"doing business within," "single issue," and "limitation on resales."
Rule 147 does provide greater certainty of application than section
3(a)(l 1). Conditions of Rule 147 include:
(1) that the issuer is a resident (as defined) and doing business
(as defined) in the state in which the securities are offered and
sold;
(2) that all offerees and purchasers (other than specified foreign
purchasers) are residents within such state; and
(3) that the issuer take precautions against interstate distribu-
tion, including limiting resales for a period of nine months after
the last sale which is a part of the issue.
Inadvertent or immaterial deviations from the Rule 147 require-
ments will cause the exemption to be lost. An offer made to a cor-
poration, the principal office of which is outside the state, can
remove the availability of the exemption. Similarly, the failure to
put a particular legend on certificates, even if no resales occur
within the specified period, may cause the exemption to be lost.
These risks in attempting compliance with the safe harbor may lead
the start-up company to conclude that the best course is to comply
as best as possible with the Rule, but depend on section 3(a)(11),
even with its uncertainties. Because the private offering exemption
may also be potentially available, a shotgun approach to compliance
may be the most effective approach. This will allow the start-up to
rely on the potential availability of each of the exemptive
provisions.
Regulation D. Whether by default or by devise, most offerings
by start-up companies depend upon Rule 4(2) and Regulation D.
Much has been written concerning Regulation D in the three years
since it was implemented, and several fine summaries of its provi-
sions exist.2 3 The SEC in its release adopting Regulation D stated
that the Regulation was "designed to simplify existing rules and
regulations, to eliminate any unnecessary restrictions that those
rules and regulations place on issuers, particularly small businesses,
23. E.g., Donahue, New Exemptions From the Registration Requirements of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933: Regulation D, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 235 (1982); Donahue, Regulation D: A
Primer for the Practioner, 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. REv. 495 (1983); Schneider, Introduction to
Regulation D, 15 REv. SEC. REG. 990 (1982); Schneider, Regulation D-Evaluation and Cri-
tique (part 2) 15 REv. SEC. REG. 983 (1982).
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and to achieve uniformity between state and federal exemptions in
order to facilitate capital formation consistent with the protection of
investors."2
Rule 506 relates to transactions which are deemed to be ex-
empt from registration under section 4(2) of the 1933 Act. Rule
506 is available to all issuers for offerings sold to not more than 35
sophisticated purchasers, plus an unlimited number of "accredited
investors. '25 Rule 506 requires the issuer to make a subjective de-
termination that each purchaser, other than accredited investors,
meets certain sophistication standards, but does not require, as the
predecessor to Rule 146 did, that each offeree meet sophistication
standards. The exemption retains the concept of a "purchaser rep-
resentative" so that unsophisticated purchasers may participate
with the aid of another person. There is no requirement under Rule
506 that an investor be able to bear the economic risk of investment.
Rule 506 prohibits any general solicitation or general advertising
and mandates that certain disclosure be made.
Rule 505 provides an exemption for offers and sales not exceed-
ing $5,000,000 in any 12 month period where sales are made to not
more than 35 purchasers and an unlimited number of accredited
investors. Rule 505 is available to corporations, partnerships, and
any other issuer that is not an investment company. No general
solicitation or advertising may be employed. Rule 505 does not im-
pose sophistication requirements for purchasers of securities as does
Rule 506. Certain information is required to be disclosed, varying
on whether or not the issuer is a reporting company under the 1934
Act.
Availability of the Rule 504 exemption is limited to situations
where no more than $500,000 of securities is to be sold in a 12
month period. The advantage of Rule 504 is that there is no ceiling
24. SEC Release No. 33-6389 (Mar. 8, 1982), 24 SEC DOCKET 1166. In SEC Release
No. 34-6437 (Nov. 19, 1982), 26 SEC DOCKET 1090, a new preliminary note 7 was added
(relating to sales to non-United States residents and citizens), the Note to Rule 502(a) was
modified, Rule 502(a) was modified, and Rules 502(b)(2)(i)(C) and (D) were added.
25. Accredited investor under Rule 501 of Regulation D means any person who comes
within one of the following eight categories or who the issuer reasonably believes comes
within one of the categories at the time of sale: (1) certain identified institutional investors
such as banks, insurance companies and registered investment companies; (2) private business
development companies; (3) organizations exempt from taxes under § 501(c)(3) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code; (4) directors, executive officers or general partners of the issuer; (5) any
person who purchases $150,000 of securities where the purchase price does not exceed 20%
of the purchaser's net worth; (6) individuals with a net worth exceeding $1,000,000; (7) indi-
viduals with $200,000 in income anticipated for the current year; and (8) entities composed
entirely of accredited investors. Reg. D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (1985).
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on the number of investors, and if the offering is conducted exclu-
sively in states where it is qualified or registered with the state se-
curities commission (and if the state requires the delivery of
disclosure documents before sale), there are no restrictions on the
manner of the offering and on resale.
Rules 501 through 503 provide certain definitions and general
conditions applicable to all Regulation D offerings. The eight terms
defined in Rule 501 are (i) "accredited investor," (ii) "affiliate," (iii)
"aggregate offering price," (iv) "business combination," (v) "calcu-
lation of number of purchasers," (vi) "executive officer," (vii) "is-
suer," and (viii) "purchaser representative."
Despite the improved certainty under Regulation D, the avail-
ability of the Rule 505 and 506 exemptions hinges on some critical
subjective determinations, including:
(1) whether the issuer has taken sufficient steps to have a "rea-
sonable belief" as to purchaser qualification;
(2) whether the issuer reasonably believes that the purchaser
representative meets the Regulation D requirements;
(3) whether non-accredited investors are involved, and if so
whether adequate information has been provided; and
(4) whether inadvertent failure to meet a technical requirement
(such as the date of filing or purchasers representative acknowl-
edgement) will cause the exemption to be unavailable despite the
issuer's best efforts.
Of the above factors, the information requirement is the most
difficult for a start-up business to meet, especially in high technol-
ogy fields with which investors are not generally familiar. There-
fore, the attorney will often be faced with clients wishing to spend
the least money possible to meet these standards, which ordinarily
means omitting as much disclosure as possible. If sales are made
only to accredited investors, Rule 505 and 506 do not require spe-
cific disclosures other than restrictions on transferability.2 6 When
sales are made to as few as one unaccredited investor, however,
there are specific information requirements which vary depending
on the size of the offering and nature of the issuer.2 7 Start-up com-
26. SEC Release No. 33-6455, § ILA (Mar. 3, 1983), 27 SEC DOCKET 347, 354.
27. This article focuses on disclosures required by companies without securities regis-
tered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and which are raising less than $5,000,000.
The requirements for all issuers are found in Rule 502(b) of Regulation D. Generally, all
other issuers are subject to slightly greater disclosure requirements.
Note that this differential in disclosure is a recognition by the SEC of a cost/benefit
analysis in disclosure similar to the cost/benefit decision with respect to Regulation D. In-
deed the entire thrust of the liberalization of the small offering provisions has been a trade off
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panies making offerings of up to $5 million must provide the same
kind of information required by Part I of Form S-18 or, for issuers
to whom Form S-18 is not available, the information required is
that specified by the applicable registration form that would be used
in a public offering.
The information required to be provided under Regulation D
need not be included in one document,28 or be received at the time
of the offer. However, it is normal to have some sort of written
disclosure document that investors can review prior to the closing
of their investment. Even when no disclosure document is required
by Regulation D, it is recognized as good legal protection from the
antifraud provisions under Sections 12(2) and 17(a) of the 1933
Act29 and Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934,3 to provide a private placement memorandum.
To understand how potentially burdensome the information
requirements necessary to meet these safe harbor standards can be,
it is useful to review the specific kinds of information specified in
Form S-18. Several primary areas raise disclosure compliance is-
sues for start-up companies. Good legal counsel in these areas can
separate the important from the unimportant, so that scarce re-
sources can be best allocated to preparing the most important
disclosures.
The disclosures required in connection with sales of securities
to unaccredited investors tie directly into the standard disclosure
items for public offerings registered with the SEC in Regulation S-
K.31 The applicable items of Regulation S-K cited in Form S-18
include disclosures concerning use of proceeds, business operations,
properties, legal proceedings, selected financial data, management
information and remuneration, transactions with management and
certain parties, risk factors and interests of named experts and
counsel. In addition, the following financial statements are required
to be certified by an independent certified public accountant unless
to obtain such statements would require "unreasonable effort and
expense":
a. audited balance sheet as of the end of the most recent fiscal
of costs to the issuer versus protection to the investor. This is a different cost/benefit analysis
from that of the issuer. Reg. D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (1985).
28. SEC Release No. 33-6455 § II.A. (Mar. 3, 1983), 27 SEC DOCKET 347, 354, Ques-
tion and Answer No. 40. (The answer states that several disclosures are adequate provided
material information is not obscured in the process.]
29. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1983); 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1983).
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1983), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985).
31. 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1985).
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year, or as of a date within 135 days of the date of their memo-
randum if the issuer has been operating for less than one year;
b. an interim balance sheet (unaudited) within 135 days of the
date of the memorandum if the audited balance sheet is dated
prior to such date; and
c. audited statements of income, changes in financial position,
and stockholder's equity for the two prior fiscal years and for any
interim period.
A literal application of these disclosure requirements would
mean great expense to an issuer. However, the SEC staff in infor-
mal settings has placed a heavy emphasis on the general qualifier
that appears in Rule 502(b)(2)(i) relating to non-reporting compa-
nies. That rule requires disclosure "to the extent material to an un-
derstanding of the issuer, its business, and the securities being
offered."32 Moreover, Regulation D only requires that the informa-
tion include "the same kind of information" required by Form S-18.
The net effect of these provisions is to throw any offering to nonac-
credited investors into a subjective playground of materiality. Com-
pliance is a question of judgment dependent on the experience and
capability of the securities lawyer. The attorney has few guidelines
to which to refer the client. If a client is raising a substantial sum of
money and has sufficient funds, it can choose to be very safe or, if so
inclined, it can cut corners on the theory that investors are receiving
all material information. Financial information can be further re-
stricted with the justification that its preparation would entail un-
reasonable effort and expense.
Although issuers in many cases begin an offering with the
intent of approaching only accredited investors, very often the offer-
ing cannot be successfully completed on this basis. Notwithstand-
ing the additional risk, the offering is often broadened in order to
have a chance of success. Such expansion does not leave sufficient
time for qualified counsel to consider the materiality of each partic-
ular disclosure in order to prepare an adequate disclosure docu-
ment. For this reason, many disclosure documents are not sufficient
to meet the strict Regulation D disclosure standards. The attorney
should not let this occur without determining where the client will
next look for an exemption and explaining the risk that the new
exemption may not be available.
An attorney should counsel that some effort should be made to
comply fully, within reason, with the information requirements of
Form S-18 unless it is abundantly clear that specified information is
32. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(2)(i) (1985).
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immaterial. However, the client should be made aware of the ex-
tent of uncertainty in legal requirements and the considerable po-
tential savings. The continuum of the range of compliance must be
explained. Together with the client, the attorney can construct a
course of action that allows the transaction to proceed, given lim-
ited financial resources, yet provides the best legal protection to the
client. Even within the greater certainty of Regulation D, a cost/
benefit approach is a necessity to choose the most appropriate
course.
Some of the principal areas in which counsel may provide the
client with assistance in balancing the Regulation D disclosure re-
quirements are set forth below. These are often the areas in which a
high technology start-up business runs a high risk of non-
compliance.
1. Description of the Business
Item 101(c) of Regulation S-K sets forth the disclosure require-
ments for "Narrative Description of the Business," including 12
specific items."3 Securities counsel familiar with the SEC knows
that finalizing the business description can involve significant give
and take with underwriters, underwriters' counsel, accountants and
the SEC staff. Such prolonged drafting in the context of a registra-
tion leads to a document that can be comfortably assumed to com-
ply with the Item. However, for the early-stage business, that
disclosure process is an unobtainable luxury. Of course, if all mate-
rial information is included there is no risk connected with non-
compliance. Unfortunately, what is material is always viewed in
hindsight-often a loss has occurred and an investor is suing for the
investor's money back. Moreover, for a high technology business,
getting the description into layman's language and put forward in a
concise and readable manner is difficult. This may be especially
true when there are no industry prospectuses or offering circulars
33. Item 101 of Regulation S-K sets forth the registration statement disclosures re-
quired for filings with the SEC on Form S-1. Item 101(c) calls for a narrative description of
the company's business. The discussion must be broken down with separate discussions of
each of the company's industry segments. The item requires a discussion of the principal
products produced and services rendered by the company and the markets for and distribu-
tion of them, the status of any material product in development and the sources and availabil-
ity of raw materials. The item also requires disclosure of the importance and duration of
patents, trademarks and other such rights, the seasonality of the business, industry practices
with respect to working capital, the company's dependence on a small number of customers
and the amount of firm backlog. Three year's worth of research and development expendi-
tures and the competitive conditions in the industry also must be disclosed. Reg. S-K, 17
C.F.R. § 229.101 (1985).
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for comparison. The role of good counsel is to identify the material
items that add value or bring risk to the business so that the client
can expend resources effectively to describe these items. Even if the
client does not wish to incur the expense of having counsel draft the
description, the attorney should discuss areas of particular exposure
so that the client can complete the disclosures.
2. Backlog and Principal Customers
Regulation S-K specifically requires that the firm backlog of
the company be reported and that principal customers (greater than
10%) be identified. In the private offering context there is often
little if any backlog. Many companies are sensitive to disclosures
such as these, but they are material and are not good areas in which
to cut corners in disclosure.
3. Management, Compensation and Certain
Transactions
The requirements in Rules 301, 302 and 303 of Regulation S-K
for management and related party transactions can be complex.34
This is an area in which it is common to cut corners in a private
placement memorandum. Often, compensation information which
would not be unusual if disclosed is, nevertheless, sensitive within
the company itself. Related party transactions may be omitted be-
cause the founder feels they were fair and are not material to inves-
tors. Although good arguments can be made that such omissions
are justified, care should be exercised that "qualitative materiality"
(items that reflect on the quality or integrity of management) is dis-
cussed with the client. Often, transactions of no financial interest
reflect on the quality of management and are clearly material from a
securities standpoint.
4. Use of Proceeds
Too often, private placement memoranda use boilerplate "use
of proceeds" sections that are very general. Early stage companies
often have very specific financial needs and targeted uses. The sec-
tion discussing use of proceeds must tie to the plan of business de-
scribed in the memorandum. Counsel involvement in these areas, if
written disclosure is prepared, is always cost-effective.
34. See Harroeh, The Private Placement Memorandum-Management and Ownership
Interest, START-UP COMPANIES, § 10.07 (1985).
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5. Risk Factors
Early stage businesses that do not include a carefully tailored
and specific risk factor written disclosure document to investors
waste their best insurance policy.35 The risk factors should always
relate to discussion elsewhere in the memorandum that provide
more detail. Quite often, this section can use more attention than it
is given, and, unfortunately, omissions are usually material. Time
and effort spent on this section should always be cost-effective if
disclosure is prepared.
6. Projections
The SEC encourages issuers to include projections of future
economic performance when filing securities.36 Rule 17537 under
the 1933 Act and Rule 3b-638 under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 provide safe harbors to protect certain forward looking state-
ments in SEC filings. The safe harbors protect forward looking
statements made in good faith and with a reasonable basis. There is
no similar safe harbor for projections in private placement memo-
randa. However, the SEC has indicated in a no-action letter that
projections in a private offering memorandum are acceptable if
made under the standards of the safe harbor, presented in an appro-
priate format and accompanied by information adequate to allow
the investors to make their own judgments.39 The entrepreneur
may believe projections are important to sell his or her securities.
Often projections are stretched so that a reasonable basis is not ap-
parent and sufficient backup is not included. Although a client may
decide it is not cost-effective to have an attorney or accountant re-
view projections, the risk of inclusion should be made clear by the
attorney.
7. Exhibits and Opinions
The exhibits that are normally filed with the SEC in connection
with registration statements do not need to be included in a private
placement memorandum to meet the disclosure requirements of
Regulation D. However, they need to be listed and made available
to investors upon request. This includes a required opinion of coun-
35. Id.
36. See General Note (b), Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1985).
37. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1985).
38. See generally, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1985).
39. SEC No Action Letter, Reg. A, 3(b)-Rule 254, Hendricks & Tomlinson, Avail. July
15, 1976.
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sel if tax attributes are important to investors (as in research and
development partnerships). Issuers may imperil their exemption if
they decide not to provide such information. The issuer should be
advised that the decision that it is not worth the expense to prepare
these items may be a decision to depend on an exemption outside of
the safe harbors.
III. LONG TERM VERSUS SHORT TERM COST
The preceding discussion has argued that a cost/benefit ap-
proach to securities law compliance is not only possible, but for the
start-up company may be appropriate because in many areas a
broad range of compliance exists. Assessment of the risk an issuer
and its founders are willing to bear is an important determinant of
the ultimate decision. However, the appropriate cost/benefit trade-
off does not merely involve assessing whether one will be discovered
to be in violation of the securities laws and, if so, the short-term
financial consequences. It is also not a matter merely of the likeli-
hood of success in a civil lawsuit.
Entrepreneurs, assisted by counsel, should review the long-
term needs and desires of the company and its shareholders and act
consistently with those goals. Without a perspective on the deci-
sion, early-stage companies can focus exclusively on short-term
considerations. Thus, if without a capital infusion, the company
will close its doors and stop research on its only future product, the
company may wish to assume more extreme risk through a very
liberal approach to compliance. A real estate partnership that will
self-liquidate and conduct no other offerings of securities and which
has a conservative investment objective may have no need to con-
sider future securities issuances or the negative publicity associated
with securities litigation. Similarly, early-stage companies may allo-
cate legal resources initially to one area, such as trade secret or pat-
ent protection. It may be a valid business decision that such
expenditures are more important than money spent on securities
compliance.
Most entrepreneurs connected with high-technology start-ups
seek to build a successful enterprise and then capitalize on their suc-
cess through a sale of the company or taking the company public.
In addition to these goals, however, these entrepreneurs commonly
desire to maintain acceptance in their communities and retain op-
tions for future business opportunities. These ultimate goals are a
benefit that should be worth substantial costs, both in terms of per-
sonal effort and legal and other professional fees. Knowledge of
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these goals, and experience in compliance, can help obtain the bene-
fits of compliance at the lowest ascertainable cost.
Good counsel in securities compliance, in this light, can be
money well spent. The client need not take the most conservative
path, and is not well served by an attorney capable only of seeing a
transaction in this light. On the other hand, a cavalier approach to
securities law compliance or retention of counsel unfamiliar with
the issues, in order to minimize short-term costs, can be equally
damaging. Securities counsel familiar with the ultimate goal can
tailor the degree of compliance. If a company desires to make an
eventual public offering of its stock, it will require clean legal opin-
ions to the underwriters of the offering. Securities counsel can help
avoid contingent liabilities that may hinder or prevent future sales
of the company's securities.
Non-securities issues have adverse securities implications in the
event of a subsequent public or private offering of securities. Loose
contract practices or credit extensions can lead to contingent obliga-
tions or expensive legal negotiations prior to a documented public
offering. Similarly, overly complex compensation arrangements
adopted without benefit of counsel may be embarrassing to include
in a subsequent SEC disclosure document. In each case, a short-
term decision that the cost of compliance, or proper documentation,
exceeded short-term needs, may run counter to the long-term cor-
porate interests. In each case the decision as to the allocation of
corporate resources is still properly a business decision; however,
good counsel can accommodate the process.
The taint that may accompany even the appearance of a securi-
ties law problem is often the most important consideration to in-
dividuals involved in a start-up company. A civil action, and
surrounding publicity, may adversely affect a company even when
the company ultimately prevails. Similarly, because disclosure may
be required in subsequent offerings, it can hinder capital raising by
individuals or the company in the future, or increase the cost of
raising such funds. If an administrative enforcement action is
brought successfully (which includes a settlement to avoid litigation
costs), individuals may be prevented by state laws or Rule 505 from
access to the private offering exemptions.40 None of these factors
40. Rule 505(b)(2)(iii) removes the availability of the Rule 505 exemption from issuers
described in § 230.252(c), (d), (e), or (f) of Regulation A, with certain exemptions. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.505 (1985). Generally, these provisions make the exemption unavailable if the issuer,
any of its predecessors or affiliates, or any of its officers, directors, general partners or owners
of 10% or more of any class or security have been convicted within 10 years of a felony or
misdemeanor in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, or are subject to an
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should prevent an intelligent cost/benefit approach to an issue, but
all of them demonstrate the necessity for good and knowledgeable
counsel to make the proper decision. In addition, with good coun-
sel, risks can be minimized by allocating scarce company resources
to the most crucial compliance areas.
IV. CONCLUSION
The uncertainty of legal standards under securities laws en-
courages intelligent cost/benefit decisions by businesses. This arti-
cle has outlined how strict technical compliance in the private
offerings of securities may be practically impossible for many small
companies. A realistic appraisal of the risks involved in proceeding
with compliance is critical. To the extent that our legal training
views these issues in a right/wrong vacuum, lawyers run the risk of
doing a disservice to their clients. Appropriate legal counsel should
differentiate the clearly legal from the clearly illegal, but should not
downplay the judgments involved in distinguishing these extremes.
Assuming a client is operating in good faith, this course should not
cause counsel significant ethical problems. Of course, no attorney is
compelled to continue representing a client whose judgment is sus-
pect in the counsel's eyes, and counsel should not knowingly assist
in avoiding clear legal requirements. But the decision of liberal ver-
sus conservative approach to securities compliance is ultimately a
business decision to be made by the client with advice from exper-
ienced counsel.
order, judgment or decree of a court enjoining or restraining any continuing practice in con-
nection with the sale of any security. Many states have adopted similar prohibitions which
remove the availability of private offering exemptions under state law.
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